is the same desire to escape from imprisonment on the earth, that is manifest in the attempt to create life in the test tube'. 3 She warns against the blind arrogance of exchanging human existence, organic life connected to the natural world, for 'something he has made himself': 'a great many scientific endeavours have been directed toward making life also "artificial," toward cutting the last tie through which even man belongs among the children of nature '. 4 This desire to 'cut the last tie' was first legitimised by Sputnik 1, but also later by Yuri Gagarin -the first human in space -in 1961, and by Apollo 11 in 1969, with the first man on the moon. The 1960s saw mankind and its technological mastery break through the heavens and into the stars: '[b] ut, curiously enough, this joy was not triumphal reaction […] . The immediate reaction, expressed on the spur of the moment, was relief about the first "step toward escape from men's imprisonment to the earth"'. 5 Rather frighteningly, we are several steps closer to achieving this goal. The possibility of relocating humanity to another planet is something NASA is hoping to achieve with the Mars expedition in the 2030s. 6 The boundary dividing the dystopian futures of science fiction and reality is dissolving rapidly as we enter the age of the Anthropocene -the epoch in which human 1 Hannah Arendt's The Human Condition discusses how human achievements and our existence on the planet should be, and has been, understood throughout Western history. She stresses the value of vita activa (active life) over vita contemplativa (contemplative life), and lays out the three fundamental categories of the vita activa: labor, work, and action. See Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998 Press, [1958 In 'returning to earth', Dick forefronts the figure of the animal to highlight the apparent disconnection between the human and nonhuman worlds in contemporary culture. The animal appears in his apocalyptic settings to reaffirm human authenticity, by identifying compassion as an advantageous and uniquely human attribute. The animal provides the chance for redemption but is also a figure fraught 
11
Despite attempts made throughout history to privilege human life over all other lifeforms, Heise suggests that 'a consideration of human identity as altered by contemporary technologies is no longer complete without a concurrent account of its relation to animal modes of being' 12 . As the consequences of climate change intensify, the inter-species relations become increasingly relevant for environmentalism.
To cite Donna Haraway:
By the late twentieth century in United States scientific culture, the boundary between human and animal is thoroughly breached […] . Movements for animal rights are not irrational denials of human uniqueness; they are clear-sighted recognition of connection across the discredited breach of nature and culture.
13
The birth of Disnature, with the opening of Disneyland in 1955, marked in the American public consciousness a disconnection from organic nature; the 'meaning of nature shifted from its utility in the nineteenth century as a frontier resource and romantic emblem to its provision of light entertainment on television and internet in the twentieth century'. 14 Replacing the American wilderness, the 'fantastically fake landscape' of Disneyland offered a 'self-contained plastic ecosystem […] . After the death of his sheep, the protagonist Rick Deckard purchases an electronic sheep, which resembles his deceased pet in both appearance and behaviour. Even the repair truck is outfitted as an 'animal hospital something', and the 'driver dresses like a vet, completely in white'. 20 Deckard describes the difference between his organic and synthetic sheep:
. It's a premium job. And I've put as much time and attention into caring for it as I did when it was real. But -" He shrugged.
"It's not the same", Barbour finished.
"But almost".
21
The danger posed by the artificialisation of the natural world, from an environmentalist perspective, is that the desire for artificial animals neglects, as Heise suggests, the 'unpleasant realities of ecological deterioration and species extinction', and threatens to substitute the natural world for a synthetic natural order. 22 As animal and human bodies become increasingly replaced or enhanced by technology, and as the connection between nonhuman and human worlds disentangles, the human becomes itself androids by their aversion to animal abuse (though both share a proclivity towards violence in general).
In the novel, the android is in many ways superior to the human, their only weakness is their inability to express empathy. They, unlike humans, cannot express compassion or sympathy and therefore do not see any value in animal life. The Voigt-Kampff test, an empathy test used to identify androids, consists predominately of using examples of animal cruelty to elicit an emotional response, primarily that of disgust. Dick does not fail to identify the irony that the perpetrators of these injustices are humans
and not androids; a hypocrisy he draws upon to expose humanity's more detrimental characteristics.
Pris Stratton and Irmgard Baty, two of the escaped Nexus-6 androids, find a spider in J. R. Isidore's flat, a human living alone in derelict San Francisco. Isidore is horrified by Pris and Irmgard, who begin torturing the spider: 'Pris clipped off another leg, restraining the spider with the edge of her hand. She was smiling'. 25 This demonstration of animal cruelty terrifies Isidore, who knows how precious animals are to the remnants of human society, and cannot comprehend how the androids, who resemble human women in every likeness, could harm perhaps 'the last living spider on Earth':
"Please", Isidore said.
Pris glanced up inquiringly. "Is it worth something?" "Don't mutilate it", he said wheezingly. Imploringly.
26
After Luba Luft, an android working as an Opera singer, is violently murdered at the hand of a fellow bounty hunter Phil Resch, Deckard remarks: 'I don't get it; how can a talent like that be a liability to our society? But it wasn't the talent, he told himself; it was she herself'. 27 It is never stated exactly in what way Luba is a 'liability', beyond the fact that she is mechanical and more talented than any other human musician. Both these aspects threaten society in the same way, by suggesting that the human is inferior to the android. The inability to easily distinguish between androids and humans, between the organic and the simulation of organic life, diminishes the value attributed to humanity. The human is no longer unique in its ability to express rational thought and can be reproduced synthetically in a lab and improved upon. In How We Became Posthuman (1999), Katherine Hayles argues that androids in Dick's fiction are associated with the unstable boundaries between the self and the world: '[w]hen system boundaries are defined by information loops rather than epidermal surfaces, the subject becomes a system to be assembled and disassembled rather than an entity whose organic wholeness can be assumed'. 28 The cybernetic body both addresses and destabilises the boundaries between the human and nonhuman world, and between the organic and the synthetic. The technologisation of the human body causes the disintegration or fragmentation of the self, which can no longer be identified as completely and singularly human.
After Luba Luft's death, Deckard "If I test out android", Phil Resch prattled, "you'll undergo renewed faith in the human race. But, since it's not going to work out that way, I suggest you begin framing an ideology […] . That would explain me as part of the human race".
30
Deckard concludes that there must be something wrong with him, and not Resch, because he experiences empathy towards androids despite considering them objects and therefore inferior to organic lifeforms.
This realisation makes him suddenly aware not only of the fact that androids imitate humans flawlessly, (so much so that he empathises with them as if they were human), but also informs him that this distinction is almost completely arbitrary when androids appear to behave more like humans than the actual humans surrounding him. Androids pose a danger to humanity precisely because they are subjects and not objects. As Hayles states:
[t]hey think, feel outrage, bond with their fellows. Given their abilities, they should be able to participate in the social realm of human relations […] they are not objects improperly treated as if they were social beings but are social beings improperly treated as if they were objects.
31
In his desperate attempts to prove his own humanity, Deckard is reduced to the same murderous intent he despises in Phil Resch. At the price of killing the nexus-6 androids, he can afford to buy himself a real He forecasts doom but hopes for a better, fairer, more peaceful future; one that considers the human as part of a vibrant and all-encompassing natural world. Dick's future visions resent the technologisation of nature and the human body, and criticise man's arrogant desire to shape the planet and the solar system to his likeness. Dick offers instead a kind of pessimistic humanism which suggests an instinctive bond between human beings and other living systems. Like a disappointed but loving parent, Dick uses his pessimism to appeal to the empathetic tendencies of humanity. His doomsday narratives are not rooted in nihilism, but in a deep love for our lost and confused species. Even, and especially, now, his fiction urges us to take responsibility for our actions and prepares us for the future through scepticism and pessimism, and a relentless fondness for the human.
34 Dick, Do Androids, p. 191. 
